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The Volcker Rule: A Reminder 
of the Need for Additional 
Remedies for Party-to-Party 
NAFTA Disputes 
Jacob H. Cappel1 
When the Volcker Rule was enacted, and its proposed 
regulations were released, a shockwave of fear and uncertainty 
reverberated through the international community. The Volcker 
Rule, as proposed, had unprecedented extraterritorial effects on 
foreign financial institutions. The agencies in charge of 
implementing the Rule received thousands of letters from state 
officials and private investors across the globe expressing their 
fears and concerns. In one letter, the five largest banks in 
Canada argued that the Rule violated the United States’ North 
American Free Trade Agreement obligations. Finally, almost 
four years after its enactment, the Rule’s final regulations were 
published, which substantially allayed foreign officials’ and 
investors’ anxieties. The Rule, however, still has extraterritorial 
effects and more specifically, does in fact violate the United 
States’ obligations under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. , This unchecked violation acts as a reminder of the 
need for additional remedies to prevent future North American 
Free Trade Agreement violations. Flawless enforcement and 
prevention may not be practical, but establishing an appellate 
review system of North American Free Trade Agreement panel 
decisions, and imposing more stringent penalties on violating 
parties, could mitigate future violations.  
 
1. B.A. Economics, Whitman College; J.D. Candidate Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law.  
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I. Introduction 
“The generality of men are naturally apt to be swayed by fear 
rather than reverence, and to refrain from evil rather because of 
the punishment that it brings than because of its own foulness.” 
—Aristotle2 
 
2. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. X, ch. 9 (G.P. Goold ed., H. 
Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.).  
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Congress and President Obama responded to the 2008 financial 
crisis by passing the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,3 which included the 
Volcker Rule (the “Rule”),4 named for former Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, who long advocated for the Rule.5 The 
Rule was designed to protect Americans against another financial 
crisis by barring depository banks from using their depositors’ money 
for short-term and speculative trading.6 The Rule, however, has been 
met with a barrage of criticism from domestic as well as foreign 
officials and financial institutions.7 Before the Rule’s regulations were 
finalized, foreign officials feared that the Rule would adversely affect 
their banks and reduce liquidity of the market for their sovereign 
bonds.8 Specifically, the European Banking Federation criticized the 
Rule’s extraterritorial reach, which would allow the Rule to interfere 
 
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act (Dodd-Frank) of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
The Dodd-Frank Act was passed “[t]o promote the financial stability of 
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect customers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.” Id. at pmbl.  
4. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, § 619 (12 U.S.C. § 1851) [hereinafter 
Volcker Rule].  
5. Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, At the Finish Line on the Volcker Rule, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/12/10/regulators-vote-to-approve-volcker-rule/. 
6. See Volcker Rule, supra note 3, § 1851(a)(1); Barack Obama, President 
of the United States, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform 
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-financial-reform (“We simply cannot accept a 
system in which hedge funds or private equity firms inside banks can 
place huge, risky bets that are subsidized by taxpayers . . ..”). President 
Obama called the Rule, “simple and common-sense reform.” Id. 
Evidence showed that speculative trading had a huge impact on the 
2008 crisis; “[w]hen all the dust settled, a report by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office showed that ‘during [the] five 
quarters spanning the financial crisis . . . proprietary trading accounted 
for $15.8 billin in losses’ at the six largest bank holding companies.” R. 
Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on 
Definitions Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution Is Needed to 
Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. 
REV. 33, 48 (2011) (citing Scott Patterson & Victoria McGrane, The 
Multibillion-Dollar Leak, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204294504576615382298
044.). 
7. See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, Volcker Rule Stirs Up Opposition 
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 8:59 PM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/volcker-rule-stirs-up-opposition-
overseas/?_r=0. 
8. See id.  
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with their own regulation of their financial systems.9 Canada’s five 
largest banks argued that the Rule, as proposed, violated the United 
States’ obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”), by treating Canadian debt securities less favorably than 
United States’ debt securities.10 On December 10, 2013, more than 
three years after it was passed,11 the Rule’s regulations were finalized 
and published,12 which allayed the anxieties that foreign financial 
 
9. Letter from Guido Ravoet, Chief Executive, European Banking 
Federation, to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et 
al., Subject: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/February/20120221/R-1432/R-
1432_021312_104924_515251389875_1.pdf [hereinafter EBF Letter] 
(“It is the position of the [European Banking Federation] that the 
Volcker Rule’s extraterritorial application to global non-U.S. operations 
of non-U.S. banks should be reconsidered. This view is shaped by the 
very real possibility that the application of the Volcker Rule, as 
currently proposed, would interfere with the rights of non-U.S. 
jurisdictions to regulate and supervise their banks. This could lead to an 
unintended reduction in much needed international cooperation amongst 
supervisory authorities, a situation which would inevitably lead to 
greater regulatory divergence.”).  
10. See Letter from the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada & Toronto-
Dominion Bank to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., 
Re: Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 2 (Jan. 19, 
2012), available at http://www.cba.ca/ contents/files/misc/ 
msc_20120119_banksvolcker_bil.pdf [hereinafter Canadian Banks 
Letter]; see also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at http://www. 
worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf [hereinafter NAFTA].  
11. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2.  
12. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds (Dec. 10, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248 & 351 & 
17 C.F.R. pt. 255), available at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/ 
final/2013/bhca-1.pdf [hereinafter Final Regulations]. The agencies in 
charge of implementing the Rule received a lot of input leading up to 
the finalized regulations, which undoubtedly contributed to the delay. 
For example, on December 13, 2012, the House Subcommittee on 
Financial Services held a hearing regarding the Rule’s potential impact 
on the economy, where the Subcommittee heard from numerous 
organizations regarding the Rule’s potential adverse effects on the U.S. 
economy. See Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets, 
Businesses, Investors and Job Creation, Part II Before the Committee 
on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 112-64 (2012), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112–64.pdf. Moreover, 
the Federal Stability Oversight Council received over 8,000 public-
comment letters in response to the proposed regulations, which sought 
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institutions originally faced, by curtailing the Rule’s extraterritorial 
reach.13 
This Note argues that the Rule illustrates and reiterates the need 
for additional remedies under NAFTA’s recourse mechanisms, because 
the current remedies are ineffective at holding NAFTA members 
accountable for their NAFTA obligations. The Rule, which violates 
the United States’ obligations under NAFTA, is subject to two 
different NAFTA challenges: First, under Chapter Eleven, an 
investor14 could file an arbitration claim for damages if she alleged 
that the Rule violates the United States’ Chapter Eleven obligations.15 
Second, under Chapter Twenty, a party16 could initiate a challenge—
entailing a three-step process17—of the Rule as a violation of the 
United States’ NAFTA obligations under any part of NAFTA, which, 
if the process is followed through, would result in a decision by a five-
member arbitral panel.18 These mechanisms, however, have proved to 
be ineffective in holding NAFTA parties accountable for violations, 
especially the United States. Therefore, the Rule reiterates the need 
for additional remedies under NAFTA’s recourse mechanisms.   
input on 350 questions. See Charles A. Piasio, It’s Complicated: Why 
the Volcker Rule is Unworkable, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 737, 745 (2013).  
13. See Erica Alini, The Volcker Rule Revamp Is a Big Win for Canada, 
CAN. BUS. (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogs-
and-comment/the-volcker-rule-spares-canadian-government-bonds/. The 
Rule’s final regulations contained an exemption for foreign banks, which 
was not contained in the proposed regulations. See Final Regulations, 
supra note 11, at 404; see also Proposed Regulations, infra note 60.  
14. For purposes of this Note, the term “investor” takes on NAFTA 
definition of investor. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1139 (“[I]nvestor 
of a Party means a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an 
investment.”). An enterprise is “any entity constituted or organized 
under applicable law, whether or not for profit and whether privately-
owned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or other association.” Id. 
art. 201.  
15. Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another 
Party, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ Default. 
aspx?tabid=93&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also 
NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1116.  
16. For the purposes of this Note, the term “party” means a party to 
NAFTA, i.e., Canada, Mexico, or the United States.  
17. See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, 
NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ Default. 
aspx?tabid=93&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also 
NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 2006-2008.  
18. Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra 
note 16. For the benefit of the reader, the Chapter Twenty five-member 
arbitral panel will be referred to simply as “panel” throughout this Note.  
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Part II of this Note provides a background to NAFTA, focusing 
on Chapters Eleven (Investment), Fourteen (Financial Services), and 
Twenty (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement 
Procedures), because they are most applicable to the Rule. Part III 
explains why the Rule may violate NAFTA Chapters Eleven and 
Fourteen. Part IV explores the two current NAFTA recourse 
mechanisms listed above (available under Chapters Eleven and 
Twenty), and explains the futility of each in general and when 
specifically applied to the Rule. Part V looks at additional NAFTA 
remedies, specifically appellate review of Chapter Twenty decisions, 
and an assessment of compensatory damages against a noncomplying 
party. Part V also makes a case for why these additional remedies are 
steps in the right direction to enhance parties’ compliance with 
NAFTA.  
II. Background 
In 1994, the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into 
NAFTA19 in order to “create an expanded and secure market for the 
goods and services produced in their territories,” and “establish clear 
and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade,” among other 
things.20 Since its inception, NAFTA has produced economic growth 
throughout North America, including higher-paying jobs and 
enhanced choice and purchasing power for North American 
consumers, families, farmers, and businesses.21 In 2009, United States 
foreign direct investment in the other NAFTA parties was $357.7 
billion and the other NAFTA parties’ foreign direct investment in the 
United States was $237.2 billion.22 These figures represented a 
significant portion of each countries’ gross domestic product, 
especially Mexico and Canada.23  
 
19. See NAFTA, NAFTANOW, http://www.naftanow.org (last modified 
Apr. 12, 2012).  
20. NAFTA, supra note 9, pmbl.  
21. Results: North Americans Are Better Off After 15 Years of NAFTA, 
NAFTANOW, http://www.naftanow.org/results/default_en.asp (last 
modified May 6, 2013). According to NAFTANOW website, since 1993, 
there has been a net gain of 39.7 million jobs in North America and the 
combined gross domestic product of the parties has more than doubled. 
Id.  
22. NAFTA, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-
nafta (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
23. For example, the $237.2 billion for Mexico and Canada, represented 
10.6% of their combined gross domestic product in 2009. See World 
DataBank, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/ data/views/ 
reports/tableview.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also World 
DataBank, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/ data/ views/ 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
The Need for Additional NAFTA Remedies 
383 
From a legal perspective, NAFTA offers three different recourse 
avenues for NAFTA violations: First, Chapter Eleven enables 
investors to file arbitration claims against parties for alleged Chapter 
Eleven violations.24 Second, Chapter Twenty enables parties to 
initiate a dispute resolution process regarding the interpretation or 
application of any part of NAFTA.25 Third, Chapter Nineteen 
provides a mechanism for review of domestic antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations.26 
For purposes of this Note, Chapter’s Eleven, Fourteen, and 
Twenty are relevant, because they are most applicable to the Rule. 
Chapter Eleven provides substantive obligations that the Rule may 
violate,27 and also provides a recourse mechanism for investors.28 
Chapter Fourteen provides substantive obligations that the Rule may 
violate,29 and Chapter Twenty provides a recourse mechanism to 
parties for alleged Chapter Fourteen violations.30  
A. NAFTA Chapter Eleven 
Chapter Eleven imposes three important substantive obligations 
on parties. First, Articles 1102–04 impose an equal-treatment rule, 
which requires parties to treat other parties’ investors and 
investments31 at least as favorably as it treats its own.32 Second, 
Article 1105 requires parties to treat investors of another party “in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
 
reports/tableview.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). Whereas, the $357.7 
billion represented only 2.5% of the United States’ gross domestic 
product in 2009. See World DataBank, WORLD BANK, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
24. See Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another 
Party, supra note 14; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1116.  
25. See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, 
supra note 16; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2004.  
26. See Review of Final Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Determinations, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=93&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014).  
27. See NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1102–04.  
28. See id. arts. 1115–39.  
29. See id. arts. 1401–16.  
30. Id. art. 2004.  
31. For the purposes of this Notes, the term “investment,” from this point 
on, means NAFTA’s definition of “investment.” See NAFTA, supra note 
9, art. 1139.  
32. See id. arts. 1102–04.  
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treatment and full protection and security.”33 Third, Article 1110 
requires parties to avoid nationalizing or expropriating investments of 
investors of other parties, unless it is done for a public purpose, on a 
non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process and a 
minimum standard of treatment under international law, and the 
expropriating or nationalizing party provides a payment of 
compensation.34 
The second part of Chapter Eleven focuses on the dispute 
mechanism, which allows an investor to choose from three arbitral 
tribunals for an alleged NAFTA violation by a party: (1) the World 
Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID); (2) ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules; and (3) the rules of 
the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL Rules).35 Additionally, an investor may choose to bring 
a NAFTA claim for damages in a domestic court.36 But an investor 
would have to waive her right to initiate or continue any action in 
domestic court if she wanted to seek arbitration in a NAFTA 
tribunal.37 Chapter Eleven is unique in that it provides a private right 
of action, which is a departure from the traditional exclusive state-to-
state dispute resolution mechanisms available in most international 
agreements.38 Before the Trade Act of 2002,39 the United States was 
skeptical that frivolous Chapter Eleven claims would stifle legitimate 
policy efforts,40 because if an investor wins a Chapter Eleven claim, 
 
33. Id. art. 1105. 
34. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1110(1).  
35. Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another 
Party, supra note 14; see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1120.  
36. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1121(1)(b).  
37. See id. This waiver, however, does not apply to “proceedings for 
injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief.” Id.  
38. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of 
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 
372 (2003). For an argument in support of private rights of action in 
international agreements, see Alan O. Sykes, Public v. Private 
Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy 
(John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 235, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.39. Trade Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002) [hereinafter Trade Act].  
39. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002) 
[hereinafter Trade Act].  
40. See id. at 385 (“During debate on an appropriations bill, a congressman 
lamented that the Justice Department might have to sue local 
governments to enforce NAFTA decisions, and in a burst of fervor 
proclaimed, ‘This is nuts! We must stand together to protect the 
sovereignty of American laws.” Id. (citing 145 CONG. REC. H7368 (Aug. 
5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Shows)).  
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the losing party is left to pay the damages through taxes.41 The Trade 
Act of 2002, however, provided a means to eliminate frivolous 
Chapter Eleven claims against the United States.42 A final arbitration 
award is binding on the investor and the party to the arbitration, and 
the losing party is required to enforce the award.43  
B. NAFTA Chapter Fourteen 
Chapter Fourteen covers financial services, which are broadly 
defined.44 Chapter Fourteen imposes only substantive obligations on 
parties, and redirects its recourse mechanism to Chapter Twenty, 
except that a Chapter Fourteen claim will require a panel of financial 
services experts, which is a slight modification to normal Chapter-
Twenty procedures.45 Article 1401 sets out the Chapter’s scope and 
coverage, which includes any measures46 related to financial 
institutions,47 or any cross-border trade in financial services.48 Similar 
to the equal treatment rule in Chapter Eleven, parties must treat 
investors of financial institutions, financial institutions, and cross-
border financial services providers of other parties, at least as 
favorably as its treats its own.49 
 
41. Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under NAFTA and 
Other U.S. “Trade” Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf (“If a 
corporation wins its investor-state case, the taxpayers of the ‘losing’ 
country must foot the bill. More than $430 million in compensation has 
already been paid out to corporations in a series of investor-state cases 
under NAFTA-style deals.”).  
42. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 37, at 386 (citing Trade Act, supra note 
26, § 2102(b)(3)(G-H)).  
43. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1136 (“Each Party shall provide for the 
enforcement of an award in its territory.”).  
44. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1416 (“[F]inancial service means a service of 
financial nature, including insurance, and a service incidental or 
auxiliary to a service of a financial nature.”).  
45. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1414(1) (“Section B of Chapter Twenty . 
. . applies as modified by this Article to the settlement of disputes 
arising under this Chapter.”); see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1414.  
46. “[M]easure includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or 
practice.” NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 201(1) 
47. “[F]inancial institution means any financial intermediary or other 
enterprise that is authorized to do business and regulated or supervised 
as a financial institution under the law of the Party in whose territory it 
is located.” NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1416.  
48. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1401.  
49. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1405.  
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C. NAFTA Chapter Twenty 
Chapter Twenty provides parties with a dispute settlement 
mechanism regarding the interpretation or application of any part of 
NAFTA.50 The dispute settlement procedure outlined in Chapter 
Twenty begins with party-to-party consultations.51 If a settlement is 
not reached, then a party may request a review by the Free Trade 
Commission (FTC), and if the FTC cannot resolve the dispute, a 
party may request a panel decision.52 The FTC is made up of 
ministerial representatives of each party, and is in charge of 
implementing NAFTA and resolving any party disputes and 
overseeing the dispute settlement procedures outlined in Chapter 
Twenty.53  
Enforcement of Chapter Twenty panel decisions is largely left up 
to the parties.54 If a Chapter Twenty claim is followed through, the 
panel will publish a report containing its findings of fact, a 
determination of whether a party has violated its NAFTA obligations, 
and any recommendations to resolve the dispute.55 A panel’s decision, 
however, is nonbinding, and the parties must resolve the dispute on 
their own.56 The parties have a good-faith obligation to abide by the 
panel’s decision, but if a party does not abide, for whatever reason, 
the aggrieved party has the power to retaliate.57 The retaliatory 
power remains in effect indefinitely, and if a settlement cannot be 
met, the nonconforming party may pay the aggrieved party 
compensation.58 
 
50. See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, 
supra note 16.  
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. See Free Trade Commission, NAFTANOW, http://www.naftanow.org/ 
about/default_en.asp (last modified Aug. 9, 2013). The Free Trade 
Commission, made up of ministerial representatives from NAFTA 
parties, “supervises the implementation and further elaboration of the 
[NAFTA] and helps resolve disputes arising from its interpretation.” Id.; 
see also NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2001.  
54. See generally John C. Thomure, Jr., Star Chamber Accountability: 
Appellate Review of Nafta Chapter 20 Panel Decisions, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1997).  
55. See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, 
supra note 16. 
56. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 640.  
57. Id. at 641 (citing NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2019(2)(a)).  
58. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 640 (citing NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 
2018(2)).  
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III. The Volcker Rule Still Violates NAFTA 
The Rule presents a new type of challenge for NAFTA and its 
parties because it infringes parties’ ability to regulate their own 
financial institutions.59 On its face, the Rule treats United States 
sovereign debt securities more favorably than foreign debt securities 
by exempting only the United States securities from the Rule’s 
restrictions.60 The assurances of bank-regulation sovereignty provided 
by provisions of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement—NAFTA’s 
predecessor—and NAFTA, seemed tenuous with the Rule’s 
inception.61  
Canadian finance leaders have expressed their concern that the 
Rule will increase financing costs for the Canadian government, which 
will make it more difficult to pay off debt and support social 
programs.62 Before the Rule’s final regulations were published, 
Canada’s Finance Minister stated, in a letter to the United States 
Treasury Secretary, that the Rule, “as currently drafted would have 
an unprecedented extraterritorial reach and significant cross-border 
effects, which would be particularly problematic for Canada, given the 
close inter-linkages between the Canadian and U.S. financial 
systems.”63 The five largest Canadian banks, in their letter to the 
United States agencies in charge of implementing the Rule, argued 
that Rule’s disparate treatment of United States and Canadian debt 
securities will reduce the market liquidity for Canadian securities 
worldwide, place Canadian banks at a competitive disadvantage 
compared the United States banks, and the banks also argued that 
the disparate treatment violates the United States’ obligations under 
NAFTA.64  
 
59. See John Turley-Ewart, Volcker Rule Release Will Be Banking’s Test 
for NAFTA, FIN. POST (Dec. 9, 2013, 5:00 PM), 
http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/12/09/volcker-rule-release-will-
be-bankings-test-for-nafta/; see generally Canadian Banks Letter, supra 
note 9; EBF Letter, supra note 8.  
60. Volcker Rule, supra note 3, §1851(d)(1)(A) (“Notwithstanding the 
restrictions [of the Rule] . . . the Securities and Exchange Commission . . 
. may determine, the following activities are permitted: The purchase, 
sale, acquisition, or disposition of obligations of the United States . . ..). 
The Volcker Rule prominently excludes any possibility of exempting 
foreign obligations. Id.  
61. See Turley-Ewart, supra note 58.  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 7–8.  
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A. The Volcker Rule’s Continuing Disparate Treatment 
In the Rule’s proposed regulations,65 only United States debt 
securities were exempted from the Rule’s proprietary trading 
prohibition, while other foreign debt securities were not, which 
commanded Canadian financial institutions’ attention, in particular;66 
“[t]he extraterritorial effects [of the Volcker Rule] . . . violate 
Canada’s rights under [NAFTA] and are not justified by any evidence 
that Canadian Public Funds have been, or are expected to be in the 
future, a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system which is 
one of the principle goals of the Volcker Rule.”67 
The Rule’s final regulations, however, provide a limited 
exemption for foreign debt securities, which Canadian banks viewed 
as a huge victory.68 But the exemption is not absolute; the Rule 
continues to: (1) treat foreign sovereign securities differently than 
United States sovereign securities; and (2) treat foreign banks 
differently than United States banks.69  
First, the Rule continues to treat United States and foreign debt 
securities differently. Foreign banks that operate in the United States 
may engage in proprietary trading in the sovereign securities of the 
country whose laws they are organized under70 but the exemption 
does not permit United States banks to engage in proprietary trading 
of any foreign debt securities.71 And, the exemption does not apply to 
foreign securities if the foreign bank is a depository bank.72  
Second, the Rule continues to treat United States banks and 
foreign banks differently. Again, the exemption does not apply to 
 
65. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, and Relationship With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds (proposed Oct. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248 
& 351 & 17 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations], available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-65545.pdf. 
66. See Alini, supra note 12 (“This sent off alarm bells north of the border. 
Twenty percent of Canadian government bonds are held by non-
residents, with two-thirds of them being held residing with U.S. financial 
institutions, former Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney noted in a 
letter to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke.”). The Rule’s proposed 
regulations left the possibility of exempting foreign debt securities open; 
one of the questions asked whether the regulators “[should] adopt an 
additional exemption for proprietary trading in the obligations of foreign 
governments . . .?”). Proposed Regulations, supra note 64, at 72.  
67. Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 2.  
68. Alini, supra note 51; see Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 404.  
69. See Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 404.  
70. See id.  
71. See id. at 405.  
72. See id. at 390–96.  
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foreign banks that are depository banks, while the exemption 
continues to cover United States depository banks.73 In effect, the 
Rule allows United States depository banks to engage in proprietary 
trading in their own sovereign securities, but prohibits foreign banks 
with United States operations from doing the same.  
B. NAFTA Chapter Eleven Violation 
The Rule certainly violates the spirit of the United States’ 
obligations under Chapter Eleven,74 but an investor bringing a 
Chapter Eleven claim against the United States would face a 
definitional barrier. Recall that Chapter Eleven requires parties to 
treat investments of other parties at least as favorably as it treats its 
own.75 On its face, the Rule ostensibly violates this obligation by 
treating United States debt securities more favorably than foreign 
ones.76 The definition of investment, however, is controlling; the last 
section of Chapter Eleven defines investment as a debt security, but 
this definition, “does not include a debt security . . . of a state 
enterprise.”77 Presumably then, this exclusion would foreclose the 
possibility of any challenges by investors.  
The Rule, however, violates the United States’ Chapter Eleven 
obligations to investors who hold equity interests78 in foreign banks 
that are subject to the Rule’s restrictions. Article 1102 requires the 
United States to treat investors and investments of investors of other 
parties at least as favorably as it treats its own “in like 
 
73. See id. at 390–96, 405; see also Client Alert, MORRISON FOERSTER (Dec. 
12, 2013), http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/ Impact Foreign Banking 
Organisations.pdf (explaining that foreign banks can trade in their own 
debt securities if “[t]he U.S. affiliate is not controlled by a top-tier U.S. 
banking entity; [t]he government obligations are issued or guaranteed by 
the foreign banking entity’s country government . . .; and [t]he U.S. 
affiliate is note an insured depository institution”).  
74. One of the objectives of NAFTA is to “increase substantially investment 
opportunities in the territories of the Parties,” and the parties are 
required to interpret NAFTA in light of this objective, and others. 
NAFTA, supra, note 9, art. 102.  
75. See NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1102–04.  
76. See Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 404.  
77. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1139. A “state enterprise” is defined as “an 
enterprise that is owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a 
Party,” which would make Canadian debt securities fall within this 
exclusion and not be subject to the United States’ Chapter Eleven 
obligations. Id. art. 201(1).  
78. NAFTA includes, “an equity interest of [any entity constituted or 
organized under applicable law . . . including any corporation, trust, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or other association],” as 
an investment. NAFTA, supra note 9, arts. 1139(b), 201.  
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circumstances.”79 The Rule, however, by permitting United States 
depository banks to engage in proprietary trading in its own debt 
securities, but not foreign ones, treats foreign banks less favorably, 
and thereby treats investors of those banks and their investments in 
those banks less favorably than United States investors and 
investments “in like circumstances.”80 
C. NAFTA Chapter Fourteen Violation 
The Canadian banks’ argument that the Rule violates the United 
States’ Chapter Fourteen obligations, even after the Rule’s final 
regulations allayed the Rule’s extraterritorial reach, is merited.81 If a 
party brought a Chapter Fourteen claim against the United States, 
however, it would be the first of its kind.82 The pertinent provision of 
Chapter Fourteen, Article 1405, prohibits a party from treating 
financial institutions of another party any less favorably than it treats 
its own.83 The Rule, by allowing United States depository banks and 
not foreign depository banks to engage in proprietary trading in their 
own sovereign debt securities, seemingly violates this provision, 
especially in regards to Canada, because Canadian debt securities are 
“a core product offering of Canadian-based financial institutions.”84  
 
79. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1102.  
80. See Final Regulations, supra note 11, at 390–96, 404; Canadian Banks 
Letter, supra note 9, at 9 (“Considering that Canadian Public Funds are 
a core product offering of Canadian-based financial institutions, in the 
same way that U.S. Public Funds are a core product offering of financial 
institutions primarily based in the U.S., Canadian Banks’ ability to deal 
with our core products on a level playing field is clearly prejudiced by 
the discriminatory definition of ‘covered fund.’”).  
81. See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 8; see also Barbara 
Shecter, What the Volcker Rule Means for Canada’s Biggest Banks, FIN. 
POST (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://business. 
financialpost.com/2013/12/10/volcker-rule-canada-banks/.  
82. NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) 
(enumerating a list of NAFTA cases filed against the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico, none of which have involved Chapter Fourteen.).  
83. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1405(2) (“Each Party shall accord to 
financial institutions of another Party . . . treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords to its own financial institutions . . . with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of financial institutions and 
investments.”).  
84. See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 8; Final Regulations, supra 
note 11, at 405 (“By not permitting proprietary trading in foreign 
sovereign debt in insured depository institutions . . . the exemption 
limits the direct risks of these activities to insured depository 
institutions in keeping with the statute.”).  
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If faced with a Chapter Fourteen claim from a party, based on 
the Rule, the United States could argue that the broad exception in 
Article 1410 protects it from any kind of liability.85 Article 1410 
provides a list of exceptions to the parties’ Chapter Fourteen 
obligations, including an exception for measures taken to, “ensur[e] 
the integrity and stability of a Party’s financial system.”86 The United 
States could argue that the Rule was passed specifically to prevent 
another financial crisis, and therefore falls within the 1410 exception.87 
But this argument is without merit, because, as the Canadian banks 
pointed out in their letter, the United States has presented no 
evidence that Canadian debt securities contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis, or will contribute to another financial crisis.88 
Therefore, the United States cannot justify the Rule’s disparate 
treatment under Article 1410.  
In sum, although the Rule’s final regulations allay its 
extraterritorial effects on foreign financial institutions, the Rule 
continues to treat United States securities and banks differently than 
foreign securities and banks “in like circumstances,” and is therefore 
subject to potential challenges under Chapters Eleven and Twenty.89 
Part IV, by considering relevant past decisions by NAFTA tribunals, 
explores how these challenges might play out.  
IV. The Futility of NAFTA in Effectively Remedying 
the Volcker Rule’s NAFTA Violations 
The two NAFTA recourse mechanisms available for challenging 
the Rule are under Chapters Eleven and Twenty, and have been 
described in Part II of this Note. Although the Rule ostensibly 
violates the United States’ obligations under Chapter Eleven and 
Fourteen, the recourse mechanisms available to investors and parties 
would not provide meaningful remedies to compel the United States’ 
compliance.  
 
85. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1410.  
86. Id.  
87. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, pmbl.  
88. See Canadian Banks Letter, supra note 9, at 9.  
89. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1102–04; id. art 1405(2). Recall, that 
Chapter Fourteen does not contain a recourse mechanism. Instead, an 
aggrieved party must employ the recourse mechanism in Chapter 
Twenty. See id. art. 1416.  
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A. NAFTA Chapter Eleven Claim 
Under Chapter Eleven, whether an investor seeks recourse 
through the United States courts or a NAFTA tribunal,90 the 
likelihood for successfully challenging the Rule as a violation of the 
United States’ Chapter Eleven obligations based on past decisions, is 
extremely low. Of the seventeen Chapter Eleven claims filed against 
the United States, nine have been dismissed and the remaining eight 
are pending.91 Moreover, of the nine that were dismissed, four resulted 
in NAFTA tribunal ordering the challenging investor to pay the 
United States’ attorney fees.92 
1. United States Domestic Court 
First, any NAFTA suit in a United States court would fail 
outright. The Supreme Court, in Cohens v. State of Virginia, 
recognized that the United States is immune from suit unless it 
waives its immunity.93 The United States, with respect to NAFTA 
claims, has expressly maintained its immunity from anyone other 
than the United States.94 For example, in Berriochoa Lopez v. United 
States, Mexican truck operators sued the United States for breaching 
its obligations under NAFTA.95 The Berriochoa Lopez court dismissed 
the truck operators’ action because their claims against the United 
States stemmed from NAFTA violations, which, the court recognized, 
are barred.96 
 
90. See Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another 
Party, supra note 12; NAFTA supra note 9, art. 1121(1)(b).  
91. See Cases Filed Against the United States of America, U.S. STATE 
DEP’T, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) 
(providing a list of all Chapter Eleven claims filed against the United 
States and the outcomes).  
92. See id.  
93. Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380 (1821).  
94. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (“No person other than the United States (1) 
shall have any cause of action or defense under (A) the [NAFTA] or by 
virtue of Congressional approval thereof . . . or (2) may challenge, in 
any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction 
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United 
States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground 
that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the [NAFTA].”).  
95. Berriochoa Lopez v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 22, 22 (D.D.C. 
2004).  
96. Id. at 27. “The plain language of NAFTA Implementation Legislation 
thus requires the dismissal of all suits whose sole claim to legal relief 
stems from alleged noncompliance with NAFTA by federal or state 
government officials.” Id. at 28.  
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2. NAFTA Tribunal 
Second, an investor’s chance at a NAFTA tribunal may not be 
successful either, based on past Chapter Eleven decisions. Of the 
seventeen Chapter Eleven claims filed against the United States,97 two 
decisions in particular illustrate the difficulties that an investor would 
face if she chose to pursue a Chapter Eleven claim against the United 
States based on the Rule’s alleged NAFTA violation. In Glamis Gold 
Ltd. v. United States of America,98 and Methanex Corp. v. United 
States of America,99 Canadian investors filed Chapter Eleven claims 
against the United States and both decision resulted in dismissals 
against the Canadian investors because their claims could not 
withstand the standards set forth by NAFTA tribunals.100  
i. Past Chapter Eleven Decisions 
The Glamis Gold decision set a high bar for challenging the Rule 
under the Chapter Eleven expropriation or the fair and equitable 
treatment clauses. In Glamix Gold, Glamis, a Canadian mining 
company filed a NAFTA claim against the United States alleging that 
the United States had breached its NAFTA Chapter Eleven 
obligations because the federal government wrongfully delayed 
Glamis’ proposed project, and the California legislature passed a law 
that rendered Glamis’ project infeasible.101 The Glamis Gold tribunal 
concluded that although the value of Glamis Gold’s proposed project 
had decreased from $49.1 million to $20 million, this was not a 
“sufficient economic impact” to support its expropriation claim.102 The 
tribunal also concluded that the federal law and California law did 
not reach the level of “egregiousness necessary to breach a fair and 
equitable treatment standard of Article 1105.”103 The tribunal went on 
to conclude that the Chapter Eleven fair and equitable treatment 
standard requires the measure to present, “a high level of shock, 
arbitrariness, unfairness, and discrimination.”104 The tribunal 
 
97. See Cases Filed Against the United States of America, supra note 90.  
98. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final 
Award (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/125798.pdf [hereinafter Glamis Gold].  
99. See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 
Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/51052.pdf [hereinafter Methanex].  
100. See Cases Filed Against the United States of America, supra note 90.  
101. Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 6.  
102. Jordan C. Kahn, Striking NAFTA Gold: Glamis Advances Investor-
State Arbitration, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 101, 130–33 (2009) (quoting 
Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 536).  
103. Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 353.  
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dismissed Glamis’ claims and ordered it to pay two thirds of the 
United States’ legal fees and arbitration costs.105 Glamis Gold 
demonstrates that the standard for analyzing Chapter Eleven 
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims is extremely 
high.  
In Methanex, Methanex, a Canadian company that produced 
methanol, sued the United States under the Chapter Eleven national 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and expropriation clauses, for 
$970 million in losses as a result of a California law that banned the 
sale or use of a gasoline additive.106 The Methanex tribunal concluded 
that because there was no evidence that an illicit pretext underlay the 
California law, and there was no evidence that the law was intended 
to harm foreign investors or benefit domestic ones, the law did not 
sufficiently “relate to” Methanex or its investments.107 The Methanex 
tribunal then dismissed Methanex’s claims, concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the case108 and ordered Methanex to pay the 
United States’ attorney fees and arbitral expenses, which amounted to 
$4 million.109 
ii. Applying Past Chapter Eleven Decisions to the Volcker Rule 
The Glamis Gold and Methanex decisions illustrate the hurdles 
that investors challenging the Rule would have to jump. According to 
the text of NAFTA, Chapter Eleven decisions have no binding force 
on subsequent decisions.110 NAFTA tribunals, however, are 
admonished to communicate their reasons for diverging from previous 
decisions.111 Although there may not be a formal precedent rule, a 
NAFTA tribunal would give due weight to previous decisions.112 
 
104. Id.  
105. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
106. Methanex, supra note 98, at 1–2.  
107. Id. at 292.  
108. Methanex, supra note 98, at 292.  
109. See Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
110. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1136(1)(“An award by a Tribunal shall 
have no binding force except as between the disputing parties and in 
respect of the particular case.”).  
111. See Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 5.  
112. Id. The Glamis Gold tribunal quoted Thomas Walde, who stated in 
International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), that 
“[i]n international and international economic law—to which investment 
arbitration properly belongs—there may not be a formal ‘stare decisis’ 
rule as in common law countries, but precedent plays an important role. 
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Unless NAFTA tribunal found a compelling reason to diverge, an 
investor bringing a Chapter Eleven claim against the United States 
would, therefore, have to make out a claim sufficient enough to 
withstand the standards set forth in Glamis Gold and Methanex.  
An investor’s claim might fail outright on jurisdictional grounds 
under the Methanex decision. The United States could argue that 
there was no illicit pretext for the Rule and the Rule was not meant 
to harm foreign investors or benefit domestic ones, and therefore the 
Rule does not sufficiently “relate to” investors or their investments.113 
Even if NAFTA tribunal finds a sufficient connection between the 
Rule and the investors or their investments, the investor would have 
to show “sufficient economic impact,”114 for an expropriation claim or, 
“a high level of shock, arbitrariness, unfairness, and discrimination,”115 
for a fair and equitable treatment claim, under Glamis Gold. Either 
way, investors bringing Chapter claims would face an up-hill battle to 
successfully challenge the Rule as a NAFTA violation.116  
 
Tribunals and courts may disagree and are at full liberty to deviate 
from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can and 
should not respect well-established jurisprudence. . . . The role of 
precedent has been recognised de facto in the reasoning of tribunals, but 
can also be formally inferred from Art. 1131(1) of NAFTA.” Id.  
113. See Methanex, supra note 98, at 292; see also Final Regulations, supra 
note 11, at 405 (“Thus, the Agencies have determined that this limited 
exemption for proprietary trading in foreign sovereign obligations 
promotes and protects the safety and soundness of banking entities and 
also promotes and protects the financial stability of the United 
States.”).  
114. See Kahn, supra note 101, at 130–33.  
115. See Glamis Gold, supra note 97, at 353.  
116. See NAFTA 20 Years Later: Success or Failure, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 
2013, 1:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ news/world/2013/ 
12/31/nafta-20-years/4258905/ (“Mexico and Canada have paid out 
about $350 million in damages to foreign investors, while the United 
States hasn’t paid any . . . ‘The (arbitration) process is not like the 
domestic court system, it’s not fair and open,’ said Scott Sinclair of the 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.”). The fairness of the Chapter 
Eleven dispute resolution process is out of the scope of this Note, 
however the lack of success that foreign investors have had in 
challenging the United States provides some basis for predicting that a 
similar challenge to the Rule would likewise, be unsuccessful.  
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B. NAFTA Chapter Twenty Claim 
The likelihood of success for challenging the Rule is probably 
much higher for a party under Chapter Twenty than an investor 
under Chapter Eleven, based on previous panel decisions.117 Chapter 
Twenty forecloses any possibility of a NAFTA action in one of the 
parties’ domestic courts by another party.118 So far, there have been 
three published Chapter Twenty panel decisions.119 Of these three 
panel decisions, two involved claims against the United States, and 
both of these panels concluded that the United States had violated its 
NAFTA obligations.120 A successful challenge to the Rule, however, 
does not necessarily mean that a challenging party would get what 
they want; a Chapter Twenty panel decision is not binding on the 
losing party and the panel would not have the authority to overturn 
the Rule.121  
 
117. Recall that a party challenging the Rule would bring a claim for the 
United States’ violation of its Chapter Fourteen obligations, but the 
recourse mechanism for Chapter Fourteen claims is Chapter Twenty. 
See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1414.  
118. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2021 (“No party may provide for a right 
of action under domestic law against any other Party on the ground 
that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with [NAFTA].”).  
119. See Decisions and Reports, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-
sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=95&language=en-US (last visited Mar. 
12, 2014). The three decisions listed are: (1) In the matter of Tariffs 
Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products, which 
was brought by the Untied States against Canada; (2) In the matter of 
the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn Brooms from Mexico, 
brought by Mexico against the United States; and, (3) In the matter of 
Cross-Border Trucking Services, brought by Mexico against the United 
States. Id.  
120. See In the matter of the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn 
Brooms from Mexico, USA-97-2008-01, Final Report of the Panel, Jan. 
1, 1998, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/brooms.pdf 
[hereinafter Broom Corn Brooms]; see also In the matter of Cross-
Border Trucking Services, USA-Mex-1998-2008-01, Final Report of the 
Panel, Feb. 6, 2001, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ 
nafta20/truckingservices.pdf [hereinafter Cross-Border Trucking].  
121. See Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA 
Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 301, 315 
(2003) (“Chapter 20 panels have no power to actually overturn United 
States law. Rather, the panels issue reports that allow the United States 
to decide what course of ation to take in the event a given law is found 
to violate NAFTA . . ..”); see also Thomure, supra note 53, at 642 
(“Geared to facilitating agreement, Chapter 20 neither decides cases nor 
calculates damages.”).  
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1. Previous Chapter Twenty Decisions Involving the United States 
In the matter of the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn 
Brooms from Mexico involved a claim by Mexico that the United 
States had violated its Chapter Eight obligations.122 Mexico argued 
that the United States International Trade Commission’s definition of 
“like product,” was inconsistent with NAFTA Chapter Eight.123 The 
panel concluded that the United States International Trade 
Commission’s definition was inconsistent with the United States’ 
NAFTA obligations and recommended that the United States bring 
its practice in compliance with such obligations.124 
In the matter of cross-border trucking services involved a claim 
by Mexico that the United States, by refusing to permit Mexican 
investment in companies in the United States that provided 
transportation of international cargo, had breached its NAFTA 
obligations under Chapter Eleven’s national treatment clause.125 The 
panel concluded that the United States’ “blanket” discrimination 
against Mexican investors violated its Chapter Eleven obligations.126 
Again, the panel recommended that the United States take the 
necessary steps to bring its practices in compliance with its NAFTA 
obligations.127 
2. Applying Past Chapter Twenty Decisions to the Volcker Rule 
The two aforementioned decisions illustrate that, although no 
Chapter Twenty claim involving a Chapter Fourteen allegation has 
 
122. See Broom Corn Brooms, supra note 119, at 2.  
123. See David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA and the WTO: 
Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for NAFTA Parties, 14 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1069–70 (1999).  
124. See Broom Corn Brooms, supra note 119, at 29.  
125. See Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 119, at 1.  
126. Id. at 90. “The deprivation of the right to obtain operating authority to 
U.S. companies owned or controlled by Mexican nationals and the 
prohibition on allowing Mexican investors to acquire U.S. companies 
that already have operating authority, on its face, violates the straight-
forward provisions of NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103. Because the 
United States expressly prohibits the above mentioned investment, this 
Panel finds such prohibitions as inconsistent with NAFTA, even if 
Mexico cannot identify a particular Mexican national or nationals that 
have been rejected.” Id. at 89 (emphasis added). This conclusion would 
make it easier for Canada to challenge the Rule because Canada would 
not need to identify any of its financial institutions that were actually 
affected by the Rule, but need only argue that the “blanket” 
discrimination imposed by the Rule violates the United States’ Chapter 
Fourteen obligations to treat its financial institutions equally. See 
NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1404.  
127. See Cross-Border Trucking, supra note 119, at 91.  
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ever been decided, successful Chapter Twenty claims are possible, 
specifically against the United States. A successful Chapter Twenty 
claim means very little, however, unless it compels the violating party 
to take action in order to rectify its violation, which is where the 
Chapter Twenty remedy is lacking.128 In both Chapter Twenty 
decisions against the United States, the United States’ compliance 
was slow.129 For example, in In the matter of cross-border trucking 
services, it took almost four years before any sort of effort was made 
by the United States to comply with the panel’s decision.130 Mexican 
investors still contend that the United States has failed to comply; in 
2009, Canacar, a trade association representing individual carriers 
within the Mexican trucking industry, filed a claim against the United 
States for its alleged noncompliance with the In the matter of cross-
border trucking services decision.131 The case is still pending.132 
Assuming arguendo that a party succeeds on a Chapter Twenty 
claim alleging that the Rule violates the United States’ NAFTA 
obligations, the deciding panel would only have the power to 
recommend that the United States comply.133 Moreover, it is unlikely 
that the United States would comply based on the Rule’s political 
 
128. See Staff, supra note 120, at 315; see also Patricia Isela Hansen, Dispute 
Settlement in NAFTA and Beyond, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (2005) 
(“As in the WTO, however, the threat of sanctions has not always been 
sufficient to produce compliance with panel decisions in politically 
sensitive cases.”).  
129. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Comparative Analysis of NAFTA’s Chapter 20 
and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding 3 (Queen Mary Univ. 
of London, Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 94, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/absrtact=1969827; see also David A. 
Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
481, 517 (“Ultimately, the United States declined to comply with the 
[Broom Corn Brooms] panel ruling immediately, maintaining safeguards 
in place for nine months after issuance of the panel decision.”).  
130. See Hansen, supra note 127, at 418 (“Almost four years later, the 
United States still is not in compliance with that decision. After 
considerable delay, the Bush administration finally sought to permit 
entry by Mexican trucks . . . but a new policy has not yet been 
implemented.”); see also Marc Sher, Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution 
Under NAFTA: Fact or Fiction?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1001, 
1018 (2003) (“The Congressional response to the panel decision 
emphasizes that non-binding arbitration and the consultations and 
meetings that precede them may not be the most effective method of 
handling disputes between NAFTA parties.”).  
131. See Canacar v. United States of America, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c29831.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
132. See id. 
133. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2018.  
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weight,134 and the statutory language of the United States’ NAFTA 
implementation statute, which nullifies any NAFTA provision that is 
inconsistent with United States law.135 Because the panel’s decision 
cannot compel the United States to act, the only available remedy to 
the aggrieved party would be retaliatory measures in the form of 
suspending benefits to the United States, “of equivalent effect until 
such time as [the parties] have reached agreement on a resolution of 
the dispute.”136 Moreover, any retaliatory action is limited by other 
international agreements.137 Presumably then, an aggrieved party 
could impose sanctions on United States banks with Canadian 
branches only equivalent to the Rule’s restrictions on foreign banks 
with United States branches.  
In sum, although the Rule ostensibly violates NAFTA, the 
recourse mechanisms available to parties and investors are inadequate 
in providing remedies to induce parties’ compliance with panel 
decisions or deter future NAFTA violations. Even if an investor is 
able to mount a Chapter Eleven argument and skirt around NAFTA’s 
prominent exclusion of sovereign debt securities as “investments,”138 it 
seems unlikely that she could meet the seemingly insurmountable 
standards established in Glamis Gold and Methanex.139 Moreover, a 
party bringing a Chapter Twenty claim against the United States, 
even if successful, would not be able to compel the United States to 
 
134. Remarks by the President on Financial Reform, supra note 5 (“Over the 
past two years, more than seven million Americans have lost their jobs 
in the deepest recession our country has known in generations . . . [w]e 
have to enact common-sense reforms that will protect American 
taxpayers—and the American economy—from future crises as well . . . 
[i]t’s for these reasons that I’m proposing a simple and common-sense 
reform, which we’re calling the ‘Volcker Rule’ . . . [m]y message to 
member of Congress of both parties is that we have to get this done.”); 
see also Opening Statement by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, BD. GOVS. 
FED. RES. SYS. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131210a-bernanke-statement.htm 
(talking about the efforts made to finally implement the Volcker Rule 
and the Rule’s importance).  
135. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (“No provision of the [NAFTA], nor the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which 
is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”).  
136. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2019.  
137. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, at 21 (“Any retaliation or suspension of 
concessions taken by the aggrieved party is capped by WTO obligations. 
This means that the complaining Party may not transgress its WTO 
tariff bindings or other obligations to gain compensation for a ruling 
under a NAFTA panel.”).  
138. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1139.  
139. See Glamis Gold, supra note 97; Methanex, supra note 98. 
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act in compliance of its NAFTA obligations, and it is unlikely that 
the United States would act on its own to comply.140 
V. Additional Remedies for NAFTA Violations 
The enactment of the Rule, and its apparent NAFTA violations, 
illustrate that the remedies currently available under NAFTA are 
insufficient to deter a party from future NAFTA violations. Two 
additional steps toward compliance with panel decisions and 
preventing NAFTA violations in the first place, are: (1) an appellate 
review tribunal for Chapter Twenty panel decisions;141 and (2) the 
grant of power to Chapter Twenty panels to assess monetary 
penalties on noncomplying parties. These steps are based on the 
World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedures,142 which 
allow for appellate review of panel decisions, temporary compensation 
to aggrieved parties, and more enforcement power to panels.143 
A. Appellate Review of Chapter Twenty Decisions 
One way to address the issue of noncompliance of Chapter 
Twenty panel decisions, which has been explored by previous 
scholars,144 is by establishing a system of appellate review, similar to 
the World Trade Organization’s appellate review system.145 As 
NAFTA stands, parties are largely left to rely on their own 
diplomatic relations with each other to arrive at a mutually 
 
140. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2018; see also Remarks by the President 
on Financial Reform, supra note 5 (arguing that the Volcker Rule is 
crucial to ensure the United States’ financial stability in the future); 19 
U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1).  
141. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658–59 (arguing for appellate review of 
Chapter 20 decisions).  
142. See Functions, objectives and Key Features of the Dispute Settlement 
System, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s3p1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 
2014) (providing an overview of the WTO disputes settlement 
procedures).  
143. See id.; see also Thomure, supra note 53, at 656–57 (“The WTO’s 
dispute resolution process, a legalistic regime, includes rules and 
procedures designed to facilitate efficient, well-reasoned settlement and 
resolution of disputes by way of strict deadlines, appellate review to 
correct panel penalties for gross misconduct, and broader enforcement 
power of panel decisions.”).  
144. See generally, Thomure, supra note 53.  
145. See id. at 658-59; see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/ 
legal_e/28-dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU].  
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satisfactory resolution.146 This may present problems of 
noncompliance when parties have strained diplomatic relations.147  
Under Chapter Twenty, appellate review is possible without all 
three parties’ explicit approval.148 Article 2001 grants the FTC the 
power to “establish its rules and procedures” to carry out its duty to 
resolve NAFTA disputes among the parties.149 Appellate review of 
Chapter Twenty panel decisions could promote compliance by parties 
by: (1) providing more assurance to losing parties that panels are not 
unfairly influenced by political forces;150 and (2) providing more 
assurance to losing parties that the panel decisions are decided 
correctly.151 Although appellate review of panel decisions would 
promote the integrity of their decisions, it would not necessarily 
provide a deterrent for future NAFTA violations. 
B. Compensation for Noncompliance with Chapter Twenty Decisions 
Another way to address parties’ noncompliance with panel 
decisions is by assessing substantial monetary penalties upon losing 
parties if they choose to continue violating their NAFTA obligations. 
Comparatively, the World Trade Organization allows compensation 
as a temporary measure for noncompliance with panel decisions.152 
Again, although the FTC cannot compel compliance, it may establish 
“rules and procedures” in carrying out its duties to resolve disputes 
among the parties.153 The FTC therefore, could insist that, as a part 
of a panel’s decision, the panel must conduct an assessment of 
appropriate compensation that the losing party must pay to the 
 
146. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, at 22. 
147. See id.  
148. Thomure, supra note 53, at 658 (“[T]he Commision has the authority to 
establish rules providing for appellate review of panel decisions as 
proposed in this Article without having to enact enabling legislation in 
the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. legislatures.”).  
149. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2001(4).  
150. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658; see also Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, 
at 22 (“Because of the less detailed rules under NAFTA, winning parties 
might face a more difficult time to bring a dispute to resolution than 
they would under a more rule-based approach in the WTO.”) 
151. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658 
152. See DSU, supra note 144, art. 22 para. 1 (“Compensation and the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures 
available in the even that the recommendations and rulings are not 
implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither 
compensation nor suspension of concessions or other obligations is 
preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a 
measure into conformity with the covered agreements.”).  
153. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2001(4).  
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prevailing party if the losing party continues to violate its NAFTA 
obligations. If the assessment of damages is outside the realm of the 
panel’s expertise, the FTC may “establish, and delegate 
responsibilities to, ad hoc or standing committees, working groups or 
expert groups,”154 which could be responsible for assessing the 
damages. Moreover, for some claims, the panel must consist of 
experts.155 For example, in a claim arising under Chapter Fourteen 
(Financial Services), the panel must consist of financial services 
experts.156  
An assessment of damages upon the losing party balances the 
disputing parties’ interests. First, it addresses the aggrieved party’s 
interests by providing it monetary compensation to make up for any 
loss incurred as a result of the other party’s violation. Second, it 
addresses the violating party’s interest by allowing it to continue 
violating its NAFTA obligations if it determines that the benefits of 
its continued violation outweigh the value of the compensation it 
would have to provide the aggrieved party.  
In sum, there may not be a panacea for effective prevention of 
NAFTA violations, or effective enforcement of Chapter Twenty panel 
decisions.157 Presumably, the parties contemplated an imperfect 
system by leaving enforcement of NAFTA disputes mostly up to 
themselves.158 But creating an appellate review system to bolster the 
integrity of panel decisions, as well as imposing monetary penalties 
against losing parties, provides two additional steps toward inducing 
noncomplying parties to comply or alternatively, toward inducing 
parties to take precautionary measures to ensure that they do not 
violate NAFTA in the first place. The aforementioned steps could be 
especially effective, compared to other international agreements, 
because of the close ties between NAFTA parties.159  
 
154. See id. art. 2001(3)(a).  
155. See Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, 
supra note 16.  
156. See NAFTA, supra note, art. 1414(4).  
157. See Sher, supra note 129, at 1025 (arguing for more effective 
enforcement of NAFTA panel decisions).  
158. See NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 2003 (“The Parties shall at all times 
endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this 
Agreement, and shall make every attempt through cooperation and 
consultations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any 
matter that might affect its operation.”).  
159. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 128, at 22 (arguing that the close ties 
between Mexico, Canada, and the United could “serve as a catalyst for 
quicker, less delayed compliance,” than other international agreements, 
like the WTO).  
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VI. Conclusion 
Twenty years after its inception, NAFTA’s results have been 
applauded by some and ridiculed by others.160 Further, some argue 
that NAFTA and globalization generally are losing momentum.161 
Whether NAFTA has lived up to its objectives the parties set out, to 
“promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area,”162 and 
“increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of 
the Parties,” is debatable.163 Either way, the Rule is a new challenge, 
and the FTC could use it as an impetus to revamp NAFTA, by 
implementing steps to induce compliance in the future, in accordance 
with another one of NAFTA’s objectives, which is to “create effective 
procedures for the implementation and application of [NAFTA], for 
its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes.”164 
The Rule’s passage and the futility of NAFTA recourse 
mechanisms in place in providing any meaningful remedy, show that 
the FTC needs to take further steps to ensure that parties are 
complying with their NAFTA obligations. Although the FTC does 
not have the power to compel the parties to comply with panel 
decisions,165 it may take steps to induce them to act in accordance 
with their NAFTA obligations by: (1) bolstering the integrity of panel 
decisions by creating an appellate review system;166 and (2) assessing  
160. See Julián Aguilar, Twenty Years Later, Nafta Remains a Source of 
Tension, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.7, 2012) (“[E]conomists are calling the North 
American Free Trade Agreement a resounding success, crediting for 
fueling unprecedented trade and creating millions of jobs in the Untied 
States.. . . But critics of Nafta say ithas [sic] resulted in a loss of United 
States manufacturing and shipping jobs and in less production oversight. 
They say Nafta has also displace Mexican agricultural workers into 
other sectors or forced them to immigrate illegally to the United 
States.”).  
161. See John Jacobs, Is Globalization Losing Momentum, CANADIAN 
CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES (June 14, 2005), https:// 
www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/commentary/globalization-
losing-momentum; see also NAFTA 20 Years Later: Success or Failure, 
supra note 115 (“NAFTA is almost forgotten in the latest controversial 
free-trade effort, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a negotiation among 12 
countries, including NAFTA’s three, to open trade between Asia and 
the Americas.”).  
162. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 102(b). 
163. Id. art. 102(c).  
164. Id. art. 102(e).  
165. Id. art. 2001. NAFTA does not contain any provision granting power to 
the Free Trade Commission to compel parties to act in accordance to 
the their obligations; the Commission may, “take such other action in 
the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree.” Id.  
166. See Thomure, supra note 53, at 658.  
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substantial monetary damages to be paid to the aggrieved party if the 
violating party does not correct its violation. Again, these are not 
panaceas for NAFTA noncompliance issues, but they are practical 
steps in the right direction.167 
 
 
167. Recall, these steps appear to be within the Free Trade Commission’s 
authority under NAFTA, without having to seek the approval of all 
three parties. See NAFTA, supra art. 2001; see also Thomure, supra 
note 53, at 658. Ideally, making NAFTA panel decisions binding would 
provide a stronger enforcement mechanism. This, however, would 
require the consent of all three parties, which may not be practical. But 
see Sher, supra note 129, at 1025 (arguing that it is in the United 
States’ best interest for the parties should agree to increase the 
enforcement powers of NAFTA tribunals).  
